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Abstract:  
Ten years after delegating the responsibility for school management and operation 
maintenance to local governments, the education funding system in Poland still faces open 
challenges of fundamental importance. Although the decentralisation of education is 
commonly considered a success, the particular mechanisms of funding and legal solutions are 
hotly debated and certainly far from perfect. The financial responsibilities of the central 
government and the local authorities are imprecisely defined, which provokes conflicts and 
tensions between the main stakeholders. Moreover, the Polish education system lacks even 
the basic standards describing an efficient way of service provision. The formula used to 
allocate the so-called education subvention to individual local governments is subject to 
endless political bargains and trades and hardly reflects any reasonable policy. 
Recently, several ideas have been raised in the public debate in Poland on how to reform the 
funding of education.  However, it seems that these heavily ideologised projects go far 
beyond the necessary changes and  do not take into account either the complex context of 
decentralised education system or the experiences of other countries. 
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Legacies of the old order 
After World War II and prior to 1990, the education system in Poland was a heavily 
centralised and politicised area of public policy. The structure of schools corresponded to the 
needs of the centrally planned economy, with a large number of specialised vocational 
schools subordinated to different sectoral ministries. Primary education, general secondary 
schools as well as universities were controlled by the Ministry of Education. With respect to 
primary and secondary schools, the Ministry performed its managerial functions through a 
network or provincial Education Offices (Kuratoria). The competencies of the Kuratoria were 
very broad, and included setting school budgets, hiring and dismissing school directors and 
imposing strict programmatic and political control on teachers and pupils (Levitas, 
Herczyński 2002).     
Prior to 1990, vocational education prevailed over general secondary schools both in numbers 
and in terms of funding. In September 1990 the share of students receiving vocational training 
after completing primary education was 78%, while only 12% attended general secondary 
schools (liceum).  Half of those attending vocational schools received only basic training, and 
did not qualify for the secondary education certificate (matura).     
These figures, as well as the general shape of the Polish education system were about to 
change very profoundly in the period to come. 
  
Decentralisation in three big steps 
The milestone years for the decentralisation of education in Poland were 1990, 1996 and 1999 
(see Table 1 for the summary of the introduced reforms).  The first date indicates the 
reinstatement of territorial self-governments in the country. From the very beginning of their 
functioning, municipal governments became responsible for an important educational task – 
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maintaining and managing preschools. Starting from 1993 onwards, municipalities were also 
allowed to assume control, on a voluntary basis, of primary schools. Since 1996 the 
maintenance of the primary school network  - both in terms of human resources and physical 
facilities became a compulsory task of local governments at the municipal level.   
It must be emphasised that the decentralisation of education was not a single project restricted 
to the educational sector, but a part of a large scale reform aimed at restoring the territorial 
self-government in Poland. The collapse of communism in 1989 dramatically changed the 
shape and image of Polish politics, but in itself did not automatically alter the way in which 
the country was governed and managed. In the early 1990s Poland still remained a heavily 
centralised country with huge powers in the hands of bureaucrats educated and mentally 
shaped in the times of the old regime. The governing process was dominated by the division 
of competencies between particular ministries and other central agencies of the state, with 
little coordination and flexibility in their policies.   
The former anti-communist opposition that came to power in 1989 considered that, given the 
circumstances, the quickest and the most effective way to reform the country was to 
decentralise it as deeply as possible, and therefore devolve the competencies from the old 
structures at central level down to the representatives of local communities. In this context, 
the educational reform should be regarded as a big political project and not only, or event not 
predominantly, as the reordering of the school system. In fact, the reform was accompanied 
by a hot debate and conflict between the experts supporting fast decentralisation and those 
dealing specifically with educational matters, who argued that inexperienced, weak local 
governments would fail to manage local education systems. The clash of those two 
approaches resulted in delaying the obligatory decentralisation of primary education, initially 
planned for 1993.           
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Another major step in the process of decentralisation came in 1999, when the maintenance 
and management of secondary schools, as well as of most non-school educational tasks (e.g. 
youth hospices, boarding schools, reformatories), became the responsibility of the newly 
created county (powiat) administration (EU NTS 4 level). Before this happened, in 1996 a 
pilot programme was launched, under which some largest Polish cities assumed the 
responsibility for running secondary education establishments in their territories. The 
programme lasted for three years and proved successful enough to convince the government 
to make the next step – decentralisation of the whole secondary education sector.  This was 
accompanied by the profound reform of the country’s administrative division, involving not 
only the creation of 379 self-governing counties, but also reducing the number of regions (EU 
NTS 2 level) from 49 to 16 and transforming them from central government administration 
units into hybrid entities, with some competencies remaining in the hands of central 
government regional representatives (wojewoda - voivod) and some transferred to the 
territorial self-government -  the regionally elected council and the Marshall (marszałek) - 
head of regional administration (for the division of responsibilities after the reform see Table 
2).       
In the same 1999 also the shape of education system was changed. The three-tier path (8 years 
of primary school, 2-5 of secondary education, 4-5 years of tertiary education) became a four-
tier one, with shortened primary school (6-year), a 3-year lower secondary school and 
shortened upper secondary school (usually 3-year cycle of schooling).     
 
In 1996 Poland introduced two-stage funding of public education. As the first step, the funds 
are transferred from the Ministry of Finance to 2,500 municipal governments and (starting 
from 1999) to over 300 counties. Local authorities in turn are responsible for direct school 
financing. When distributing the so-called education subvention among local governments, 
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the Ministry of Education is obliged to take into account the size and specific features of their 
school networks. It is, however, not supposed to include preschools in the calculation, as this 
service is expected to be financed from own revenues of municipalities themselves.      
The transfer from the central budget to local governments (which are school managing 
authorities) is done through a general (lump-sum) grant (called the education subvention), and 
local governments are entirely autonomous in their decisions on how this money is spent. In 
fact, they are even allowed to finance non-educational expenditures with the education 
subvention since it enters the local budgets as an “unmarked” grant. Adopting such a radically 
decentralised solution was aimed to increase the financial capability and autonomy of the 
newly created territorial self-governments and to dismantle old management structures relying 
on central administration.     
 
Success story  
From the perspective of 12 years that have passed since local governments took over primary 
education, decentralisation has to be regarded as a success. Despite the doubts and fears 
expressed by the experts in the early 1990s, local authorities in general proved to be 
responsible and effective managers of school systems. They have radically improved the 
capital base of schools and took responsibility for the difficult and politically painful process 
of optimisation of primary school networks. During the decade, they succeeded in closing 
over 5,000 schools (25% of their initial number) and introducing an effective bussing system 
for pupils.  
 
Between 1996 and 2006, local governments spent approximately PLN 16 billion (EUR 4.5 
billion at the,current rate) on capital investments in schools and their environment. Those 
expenditures accounted on average for 6% of the total cost of schooling, with the rate 
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systematically increasing over time.  Also other structural indicators support the view of a 
rational use of resources by most local governments. The share of wage expenditures in total 
recurrent costs varied in the period 1999-2006 between 66% and 75%, recently being close to 
70%.   
As revenues from the education subvention are commonly considered by local governments 
as insufficient to cover all necessary expenditures on education (more on this in the following 
sections), municipalities have been systematically co-financing schools from their own 
resources. In 2006, 37% of their expenditures on education came from sources other than the 
education subvention.     
Decentralised education allowed for a relatively smooth introduction of the lower secondary 
school tier in 1999. This reform involved a substantial organisational and financial effort from 
local governments since it inevitably forced a serious reshaping of local school networks. Yet 
the implementation turned out to be quite successful and the number of social conflicts 
created by this occasion was considerably small.     
The concerns about the impact of decentralisation on the quality of education also proved 
exaggerated or even utterly unjustified. Standardised testing introduced in Poland in 2002 has 
proved that educational quality is relatively uniform across the country, with the differences 
in average student achievement between cities and rural areas being much smaller than 
expected (Herbst 2006). Recently Poland has also significantly improved its average score in 
PISA tests, conducted every three years in most OECD countries (Paciorek, Wiśniewski, 
Szyrmer 2007).  
 
Bottlenecks of Polish education funding 
Ten years after transferring the responsibility for school management and maintenance to 
local governments, the education funding system in Poland still faces some open challenges 
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of fundamental importance. Although the decentralisation of education is commonly 
considered a success, the specific mechanisms of funding and legal solutions are hotly 
debated and certainly far from perfect.  
From the very beginning, the local governments claimed that the resources they received from 
the central budget were insufficient to cover the necessary expenditures on schooling. Indeed, 
the recent data shows that the so-called education subvention accounts only for about 70% of 
what is actually spent at the local level.  Still, as the Ministry of Education argues, the current 
arrangement fully respects the legal regulations. According to the Law on the education 
system, provision of public education remains the so-called own task of the local authority. 
The central government is obliged to provide local governments with revenues necessary to 
perform their tasks. It is however not obliged to include all these resources in the dedicated 
education subvention. Since public education is the own task of local authorities, it is financed 
from all their revenues and the education subvention is only one of the numerous sources of 
local money available within the public finance system. If so, it is impossible to conclude 
whether the education subvention is or is not sufficient, because no law states what costs it is 
supposed to cover. This ‘catch 22’ of Polish education funding system has been skilfully 
exploited by the Ministry of Education as it faced – and won - several court trials in which 
local governments accused it of underfinancing their educational tasks. Therefore, choosing a 
lump-sum grant as a form in which the education subvention is transferred to local 
governments, with the aim of strengthening their financial capacity, proved to be a double-
edged weapon. With unmarked money, there is no simple way to verify whether what is 
transferred covers the actual expenditures.  
Clearly, financial responsibilities of the central and local governments as well as the role of 
the education subvention are not regulated precisely enough, which makes all the actors feel 
they have been fooled. The problem is however more serious than choosing the right form of 
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funds transfer. The Polish education system lacks even basic standards defining the efficient 
way of service provision. The Ministry of Education does not declare what it considers a 
rational class size, the desirable student-teacher ratio or level of non-pedagogical employment 
at school. There is a well-developed system of curricular norms, equipment and physical 
conditions standards with respect to school buildings, but what the state perceives as an 
effective use of resources (both from the financial and instructional point of view) remains 
unknown.  
Naturally, in a decentralised education funding system it is essential for local governments to 
have an autonomy in designing school networks and management of resources. What is 
needed is not a system of mandatory, executable norms of funding, but indicative standards 
that would help to draw a division line between the policies that the central authorities support 
(and commit to pay for within a certain grant scheme) and other approaches that still can be 
chosen by local governments, but with a weaker financial assistance from the central level.  
For example, if the reasonable class size is set as 25, a local government may still want (for 
social reasons or to ensure higher quality of instruction) to maintain schools with smaller 
classes, and would have every right to do so. It will be however forced to contribute from its 
own revenues, as the amount of the education subvention for this local government will be 
calculated based on the standard of 25 students per class.   
Without drawing the borders between the common state policy and its local modifications, 
one will be never able to judge whether the funding received by municipalities and counties 
from the Ministry of Education reflects their needs.         
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Dividing the education subvention  
The education subvention, being the major source of education spending, is divided between 
the local governments according to the complex algorithm (formula), announced each year by 
the Ministry of Education. The algorithm is subject to endless political bargains and trades 
and hardly reflects any real cost differences between municipalities or schools. Currently it 
contains around 40 different parameters, with most of them having a negligible effect on the 
final distribution of resources. The Ministry has no clear policy on shaping the algorithm and 
defining its function – between the redistribution of funds to less endowed areas and its 
division according to actual cost differences.  As a result, the education subvention does not 
perform effectively any of those functions.  
The algorithm was introduced together with the education subvention in 1996 and in 2000 it 
took the following general form: 
(1) ∑
=
=
k
j ijji NwAS 1*  
where: 
iS  denotes subvention received by municipality i  
A  denotes the financial standard (estimated cost of education provision) per one pupil 
jw  denotes weights attributed to k  different categories of pupils 
ijN  denotes number of pupils in category j and municipality i . 
 
Initially the formula included 21 parameters referring to different categories of students. It 
was based purely on per student funding approach, with no direct reference to school 
maintenance cost or teachers salaries. The most influential parameter, explaining over 90% of 
variations in per student funding between municipalities, was the one assigning additional 
resources to rural local governments and small towns with populations under 5,000 (Herbst 
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2000). For the list of major parameters in the formula and their changes over time, see Table 
3. 
 
In the absence of a precise definition of the education subvention and its role in the system, 
and without any financing standards applied, the shape of the formula became very vulnerable 
to political pressures and demands of local governments. In the eight years that passed it 
proved unstable and evolved from quite a simple instrument into a much more complex and 
not very transparent algorithm. The number of parameters has been doubled (being increased 
from 21 to 41), which, given the structure of the formula, lowered the importance of each 
particular weight. What is however even more important is that the algorithm has gradually 
changed its character with respect to the criteria used for the distribution of funds. Initially the 
formula was, at least to some extent, the expression of state policy regarding provision and 
management of public education. Thus, although all important decisions in this matter were 
made by local governments, the formula included some clear incentives to them, e.g. 
rewarding for the optimisation of their school networks. It also contained some elements of 
fiscal equalisation, addressing support directly to the municipalities with a low tax base. Over 
time, due to the increasing pressure from local governments (claiming that they were 
receiving insufficient funding), the formula became focused mainly on reflecting the unit cost 
differences. The most important modification involved the direct inclusion in the formula 
(since 2001) the structure of teachers employed by each local government according to their 
formal qualifications. Following the law regulating teachers’ wages (the so-called Teachers’ 
Charter), the wages of teachers in Poland are highly diversified depending on the stage of 
their career, and therefore the composition of the teacher population strongly determines the 
cost of education provision by local governments.  Between 2001 and 2004, the special 
coefficient reflecting average teacher qualifications entered the formula in an additive form, 
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just as all the other parameters. Thus, the general form of the algorithm (see equation 1) 
changed into:  
 
(2) ∑
=
+=
k
j iijji DNwAS 1*  
where iD  refers to the component reflecting average teacher qualifications in municipality i  
as compared with the national average.   
Since 2005, the formula component referring to teachers qualifications took a multiplicative 
form, so that now the formula looks as follows: 
 
(3) )(
1∑ ==
k
j ijjii NwADS          
 
The observed evolution of the algorithm to divide the education subvention among local 
governments thus relied on a gradual departure from the quasi-voucher approach, under which 
all funding was distributed on the “per student” basis, toward a mixed approach, in which 
funding criteria include both students and teachers as the main cost-drivers in education 
system.  The most concerning however is not the change itself, but the fact that it did not 
result from any consistent strategy of the Ministry of Education, but was rather an effect of 
external pressures and chaotic adjustments to the dynamic political and financial conditions.              
 
Further reform prospects            
The problems with distributing the education subvention and defining its role in the system 
provoked a debate on possible more profound reforms in financing education . The proposed 
solutions are rather radical, and vary from a partial re-centralisation of the education system 
on one hand, to its funding exclusively from the own revenues of local governments on the 
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other (see Table 4 for the review of the proposed reforms).  It must be said however that all of 
them are general, political ideas, discussed in the media or declared in political debates , 
rather than carefully elaborated, ready to implement projects.     
Surprisingly, the idea of partial re-centralisation of education funding and provision seems to 
be expressed and supported by some local governments in Poland. It should be considered as 
an act of desperation of those municipalities and counties whose expenditures on education 
substantially exceed the revenues from the education subvention. Their reasoning is as 
follows: if the state is unable to provide sufficient funding, then it should take back the 
responsibility for schooling or at least for employing teachers and paying them. Benefits of 
decentralisation are questionable if the delegation of tasks is not followed by adequate 
transfers of funds.   
In practice, such re-centralisation of education funding might be quite similar to the solution 
applied in Lithuania, where the provision for education is divided into managing the 
educational process (teachers and non pedagogical staff) - provided and funded directly by the 
central government)  and maintaining the educational environment (school buildings, 
materials, equipment) – being the responsibility of local authorities.    
In reality however, even partial re-centralisation of education in Poland is very improbable. 
The declarations in favour of such solutions should rather be treated as a form of political 
pressure on the Ministry of Education to increase funding through the education subvention.   
Another publicly announced project is the marketisation of public education by introducing a 
common voucher scheme for all schools in the country. The amount of funding that a school 
receives would be directly dependent on the number of pupils it is able to attract. Such an 
approach became a part of political programme of Civic Platform (PO), the party which won 
the parliamentary elections in 2007. Liberal politicians and experts argue that competition for 
pupils will lead all schools to improve their quality and although some of them will eventually 
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lose in the competition and fall out from the market, this will happen mostly to low quality 
schools that should be closed anyway.       
After a deeper analysis however, the voucher scheme seems to be much more difficult to 
apply and its effectiveness as the main education funding instrument becomes questionable. In 
Poland, similarly to other countries, the unit (per student) cost of school maintenance varies 
dramatically between different schools and localities. A large part of this variation is due to 
objective factors (such as settlement patterns, specific needs of certain school profiles) beyond 
the control of the managing authorities. What would be needed to reflect this diversity is not 
one voucher, but several different vouchers for particular types of localities and schools. This 
however seems to be inconsistent with the core of the voucher idea, according to which the  
amount per student should be uniform, and the shape of the school network should be decided 
by the market.         
The consistency of the common voucher idea with decentralised education management is 
even more problematic. Implementing vouchers as a mandatory funding instrument would 
automatically and very significantly limit the autonomy of local governments in managing 
their schools. That is, marketisation of schooling may be contradictory to its decentralisation, 
considered as one of the biggest successes of transitional reforms in Poland.    
For those reasons vouchers are recently much less debated and supported than they were 
during the election campaign of 2007.  
Finally, the third discussed direction of reforms involves further decentralisation of education 
funding. According to some experts (Malinowska-Misiąg, Misiąg, & Tomalak, 2008), local 
governments should finance their schools mainly from own revenues, and either the funds 
transferred through education subvention need to be drastically reduced or even the 
instrument itself should be abolished. 
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A fundamental obstacle in the implementation of this plan is an uneven territorial distribution 
of the tax base in Poland. According to 2006 data, if the education subvention is set to zero 
without any compensation to local governments, only 40% of municipalities would be able to 
cover the recurrent cost of education in their territory, and even this provided that they would 
not have any other tasks to finance.   
The simplest way to increase own revenues of local governments is to increase their shares in 
personal and corporate income tax. Still, there is no way to ensure that such additional 
revenues would be sufficient to cover the cost of education provision.  Even if the 
municipalities receive 100% of personal income tax collected from their territory (which 
obviously is not very realistic), for a vast majority of them (including practically all rural 
areas) this amount would be substantially smaller than the education subvention they receive 
now (Herbst, Herczyński, & Levitas, 2008). This means that relying on own local revenues as 
the main source for education funding is impossible without creating another redistribution 
instrument, that is – another education subvention , in order to secure equal access to 
education for pupils in different areas of the country. As a result, local Poland would be 
divided into affluent areas, which would fund education mostly from own revenues, and poor 
localities, totally dependent on transfers. In Poland, this division would additionally have a 
strong geographical dimension  - as the border line will in reality separate the urbanised west 
from the underdeveloped east of the country. From the political point of view, no to mention 
the equity of the education system, such a situation would be hardly acceptable.         
Poland faces the need to reform the current education funding system by adjusting direct 
mechanisms of financing and clearly defining the responsibilities of different stakeholders. 
However it seems that the ideas of reforms announced in public debate go far beyond the 
necessary changes and attempt to revolutionise the system. These ideologised projects do not 
take into account either the complex context of decentralised education in Poland or the 
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experiences of other countries. For these reasons they probably will never be implemented. 
Instead,  there is a need for a deliberate modification of the current system, based on a careful 
analysis of its bottlenecks and limitations.         
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Table 1. Calendar of the decentralisation of education in Poland  
Date Educational task  Overtaking institution Accompanying reforms  
1990 Management of preschool 
education 
All municipal governments Reinstatement of municipal self-
governments, first local elections  
1993 Primary schools Municipal governments 
(voluntarily)  
 
1996 Primary schools All municipal governments Introducing two-stage funding of 
education 
1996 Secondary schools  Largest cities (voluntary pilot 
programme) 
 
1999 Secondary schools All county governments Introduction of counties in the 
administrative division of 
Poland. First elections to county 
councils     
 
 
Table 2. Division of tasks in the Polish education system after decentralisation  
Task Ministry of 
Education 
Regional 
Education 
Office 
(Kuratorium) 
Central 
Examination 
Committee 
Regional 
government 
County 
government 
Municipal 
government 
Curricular 
norms, 
standards 
X      
Pedagogical 
supervision 
 X     
Standardised 
tests 
  X    
School 
maintenance, 
network 
management  
   Specific 
professional  
schools (e.g. 
teacher 
training) 
Most upper 
secondary 
schools, most 
non-school 
educational 
institutions 
Preschools, 
primary 
schools, 
lower 
secondary 
schools  
Capital 
expenditures 
   Selected 
schools (e.g. 
teacher 
training) 
Most upper 
secondary 
schools, most 
non-school 
educational 
institutions 
Preschools, 
primary 
schools, 
lower 
secondary 
schools  
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Table 3. Selected criteria and weights applied in the 2000-2007 formula 
Category of pupils Assigned weight as a percentage of 
“standard” pupil 
 2001 2004 2007 
attending schools in rural areas   133% 151% 138% 
attending schools in towns under 5,000 population 118% 128% 138% 
living more than 10 km from school 115% 100% 100% 
in municipalities with revenues per capita below 60% of national av. 110% 104% 100% 
in municipalities with revenues per capita below 92% of national av. 100% 104% 100% 
blind pupils 200% 250% 290% 
 teacher qualifications component 
teacher qualifications (structure) - additive multiplicative 
Source: Herczyński, Herbst, Levitas (2008) 
 
Table 4. Possible directions of reforms in Polish education funding 
Direction of proposed reform Supporters Details 
Partial re-centralisation Local governments with low 
own revenues and high costs 
of education in relation to 
received subvention  
Central government might take over 
selected tasks form local authorities and 
fund it directly. This refers especially to 
the salaries of teachers and non teaching 
staff, generating 70% of recurrent costs in 
education  
Voucher scheme Ruling political party (Civic 
Platform)   
Individual schools receive grants from 
central government based on the 
enrolment figures, according to the 
“money follows pupils” rule. Some argue 
that under such a scheme the competition 
for students will lead to the elimination of 
low quality schools.   
Funding from local own  revenues Large cities, ruling political 
party 
Instead of transfers from the central 
budget, the local education systems are 
financed mainly from own revenues of 
municipalities and counties (local taxes, 
local shares in income tax)  
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